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DETENTION STATUS REVIEW PROCESS IN 
TRANSNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: AL 








From the beginning of the U.S. response to the September 
2001 al Qaeda attacks upon New York and Washington, 
D.C., one issue which has continuously drawn the world‘s 
attention is the long-term detention by the U.S. of individuals 
whom it claims represent a threat to the U.S. because of their 
actions and links with al Qaeda or affiliated terrorist 
organizations. Among the questions raised in both the U.S. 
and the international community are whether and how long 
these individuals could be lawfully held, and what sort of 
process should be provided to determine whether they should 
be released from detention. Arguments as to the legal status 
of the detainees and the legal characterization of their 
respective detention sites undergird these questions.  In the 
case of Fadi al Maqaleh v. Gates,
1
 four non-U.S. detainees 
held by the U.S. in a military detention facility on Bagram 
Airfield, Afghanistan,
2
 brought habeas corpus petitions 
                                                          
*
  Colonel, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General‘s Corps, Assistant 
Professor of Law and Deputy Director, Center for the Rule of Law, U.S. 
Military Academy, and Chief Legal Advisor for the International Security 
Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, during 2008-2009.  This article 
expresses my personal views and does not necessarily reflect the official 
positions of either the U.S. Military Academy or the U.S. Army.  I wish to 
thank Professors Tim Bakken, John Dehn and Mark Welton of the U.S. 
Military Academy Department of Law for their invaluable advice and 
comments, and especially my family for their unwavering support and 
sacrifice during my deployment to Afghanistan. 
1
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009). 
2
  Formerly known as the Bagram Theater Internment Facility 
(hereinafter ―BTIF‖). As of late 2009, detention operations are now 
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before the D.C. District Court.  In ruling on the government‘s 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the D.C. District 
Court decided that non-Afghan detainees captured outside of 
Afghanistan and held at the detention facility have the right to 
have their habeas corpus petitions heard by U.S. courts, under 
the U.S. Supreme Court‘s earlier decision regarding a 
Bosnian detainee held at Guantanamo Naval Station, 
Boumediene v. Bush.
3
  On an interlocutory appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, and 
granted the government‘s motion to dismiss.
4
 The circuit 
court‘s ruling, however, because it was on a motion to 
dismiss, substituted its evaluation of the factors set out in 
Boumediene for that of the district court.
5
 Most importantly 
for this article, although the circuit court found in the 
government‘s favor, it specifically rejected an argument put 
forth by the government that the determinative factor in 
deciding whether habeas corpus protection extended to the 
detainees at the detention facility was whether the facility 
was subject to the de facto sovereignty of the U.S.
6
  
 Despite the circuit court's decision, and in light of the 
district court's decision to allow the petitioners to amend their 
habeas corpus petitions, the evolving nature of detainee 
                                                                                                                       
conducted in a new, modern detention complex known as the Parwan 
Detention Facility.  
3
  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
4
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (C.A.D.C. 2010). Petitioners' 
joint motion for panel rehearing on grounds that the U.S. plan "to transfer 
the Bagram prison facility to Afghan control" undermined the Circuit 
Court's rationale in its decision was denied, but the Circuit Court stated 
that its denial did not prejudice "petitioners' ability to present this 
evidence to the district court in the first instance." Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 
No. 095265 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010). In February 2011, the District 
Court granted petitioners' joint motion to present this evidence. Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-1669 (D.D.C Feb. 15, 2011). The U.S. plan to 
transfer the Parwan Detention Facility to Afghan control is described in a 
filed declaration of the Department of Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Detainee Policy. Declaration of William K. Lietzau, Civil Action No. 




  Id. at 94.  
6
  Id. 
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operations and the importance of these issues to individual 
detainees suggest that there will be continuing litigation in 
this area. Recently, however, Afghanistan and the U.S. have 
agreed upon a process by which responsibility for the Parwan 
Detention Facility will be transferred eventually to Afghan 
control, possibly as early as January 2011.
7
 Although such a 
transfer could moot the specific issues raised in al Maqaleh,
8
 
the question as to the proper standards to be applied in 
determining whether individuals detained by the U.S. military 
in the conflict with al Qaeda and affiliated groups should 
remain in detention would likely still be unresolved. This 
article is critical of both the district court and circuit court 
opinions, and argues that the extension of the right of habeas 
corpus to individuals who were apprehended outside the U.S. 
and who have always been held in detention outside the U.S., 
or in areas not so effectively under its complete control such 
that they are tantamount to being U.S. territory, is 
unwarranted under Boumediene and international law, and 
ignores the operational realities of the conflict in which the 
U.S. is currently engaged against al Qaeda and affiliated 
groups. The need for the executive to be given appropriate 
latitude to promulgate measures to deal with these realities, 
although reflected in the judicial deference traditionally 
                                                          
7
  See Lietzau Declaration, supra note 4; see also Allan Cullison, U.S. 
Set to Open New Afghan Prison, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2009, at A6, 
available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125832165575649413.html?KEYWORD
S=US+Set+to+Open+New+Afghan+Prison#printMode.  The task force 
which operates the facility has an Afghan National Army deputy 
commander, and has begun integrating Afghan legal processes into its 
operation.  Over 200 detainees had been released under the new detention 
status review procedure as of mid-June 2010.  LuCella Ball, Update on 




   Once the facility is under Afghan control, detainees will be 
allowed to challenge their continued detention in Afghan courts using 
Afghan judicial procedures. Afghan inmates can challenge detention, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 12, 2010, available at 
http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/afghan-inmates-can-
challenge-detention-20100112-m2y3.html. 
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accorded to the executive in foreign affairs,
9
 does not mean, 
however, that detainees in this fight should be held 
indefinitely without meaningful review of their status to 
determine whether and when they should be released. Rather, 
this article argues that the new procedures set in place by the 
Department of Defense (hereinafter, ―DOD‖) to provide an 
enhanced review process of detainee status at the Parwan 
Detention Facility
10
 are in keeping with both domestic and 
international law. Further, the process afforded also addresses 
the functional need to effectively manage the detainee 
population in a way that minimizes the potential for 
radicalization and despair among the detainees,
11
 reduction in 
the logistical costs of maintaining a detention facility in an 
active combat area, and promotion of the efficient collection 
of intelligence and the safety of military personnel in the 
field. Even if circumstances regarding the Parwan Detention 
Facility evolve to the point where the detention status review 
mechanism is no longer an issue of U.S. law because 
detainees are no longer in U.S. custody, the new Parwan 
Detention Facility procedures provide a level of process, 
transparency and regularity that make them a model for 
future U.S. military detention operations in the continuing 
fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates. 
 This article will first set out a brief history and description 
of the airfield at Bagram and the detention facilities there.  
                                                          
9
   See Regan v. Wald, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 3038 (1984).  
10
  Enclosure to Letter from Phillip Carter, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Detainee Policy, to Senator Carl Levin, (July 14, 
2009), in ―Detainee Review Procedures at Bagram Theater Internment 
Facility (BTIF), Afghanistan‖ [hereinafter ―Detainee Review 
Procedures‖] at 1, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2009/09/US-Bagram-brief-9-14-09.pdf. The circuit court 
based its decision on the procedures that were in place at the time of the 
government‘s appeal, not the new Detainee Review Procedures.  Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 n.4 (C.A.D.C. 2010). 
11
  Once it became apparent to Iraqi detainees that there was a 
transparent process that resulted in releases from detention, the degree of 
misconduct by the detainees decreased markedly, and there was a 
noticeable increase in morale amongst them. Interview with Lieutenant 
Colonel Mark Wellman, former Rule of Law and Political/Military 
Advisor to Task Force 134 (Iraq Detention Operations) (Mar. 23, 2010). 
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Second, it will explore the standards under international law 
and the implementation of national regulations by which the 
detention status of individuals detained by U.S. military 
forces is determined, when such individuals may be released 
from detention, and the significance of the evolving concept 
of transnational armed conflict to these determinations. Third, 
it will review the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Boumediene, explore the Court‘s analysis in reaching its 
decision, and identify what the Court found to be the most 
important factors in terms of applying its analysis to these 
types of detainee cases. The fourth part of the article will do 
the same for the D.C. District Court‘s decision in al Maqaleh, 
and will specifically note where the decision appears to 
misapply the Boumediene analysis and to find facts not in 
keeping with the actual situation of the Parwan Detention 
Facility.  Fifth, this article will review the D.C. Circuit 
Court‘s formulation of the Boumediene analysis in the same 
fashion. Sixth, this article will describe the new status 
determination procedures in detail and explain why they are 
sufficient to obviate the need for the extension of the 
Suspension Clause
12
 to the Parwan Detention Facility. 
Finally, were the Suspension Clause deemed applicable to the 
Parwan Detention Facility, this article will explain why these 
procedures would be an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 
proceedings, and why they could serve as an adequate model 
for current and future U.S. military detention operations 
outside the U.S. in cases of transnational armed conflict 
between the U.S. and non-state actors.   
II.  THE PARWAN DETENTION FACILITY 
 The Parwan Detention Facility is located on Bagram 
Airfield, which is approximately 40 miles northeast of Kabul, 
Afghanistan. The airfield was a major staging area for Soviet 
                                                          
12
  ―The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion, the public 
Safety may require it.‖  U.S. CONST., art. I, §9.  The writ was suspended, 
for example, during Shays Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786 and during 
the Civil War in 1863. WILLIAM WINTHROP, WINTHROP‘S MILITARY LAW 
AND PRECEDENTS, 2D ED., 1291-94 (1896).  
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forces following the Soviet invasion in 1979.
13
 During the 
Soviet occupation significant environmental damage 
occurred, and during the course of the Soviet war against the 
mujahedeen and the subsequent conflict between the 
mujahedeen themselves, the airfield suffered significant 
physical damage including large amounts of unexploded 
ordnance and uncleared minefields.
14
  U.S. and allied troops 
began using the airfield in November 2001,
15
 and in early 
2002, began using an aircraft machine shop as a detention 
facility, which in time became the BTIF.
16
 A new set of 
buildings, the Parwan Detention Facility, was completed in 
2009 and significantly improved the living standards for the 
detainees held there.
17
 The International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) regularly visits the Bagram Airfield 
detention operations, and has been doing so since 2002.
18
  
Apparently at the suggestion of the ICRC, visitations and 
                                                          
13
  Afghanistan – Airfields, GLOBAL SECURITY, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/airfield.htm 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010).  
14
  Environmental Conditions at Bagram Airfield – Information for 
Health Care Providers (HCPs), CHPPM (June 2004), http://chppm-
www.apgea.army.mil/news/BagramAirfield_ServiceMembers.pdf.  
15
  Id. 
16
  Tim Golden, In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates‘ 
Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/international/asia/20abuse.html. 
17
  Bagram Detention Center (Afghanistan), Times Topics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009, available at 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/b/bagram_air
_base_afghanistan/index.html?scp=1-
spot&sq=bagram%20detention%20center&st=cse.   
18
  International Committee of the Red Cross, Persons detained by the 
US in relation to armed conflict and the fight against terrorism – the role 
of the ICRC, U.S., Operational update, ICRC, Oct. 26, 2009,  
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/united-states-detention 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010).  See also Golden, supra note 16; Declaration 
of Colonel James W. Gray, Al Maqaleh v. Robert Gates, et al., Civil 
Action No. 06-CV-01669 (JDB), Mar. 3, 2007, at 4, ¶ 10 [hereinafter 
―Gray Declaration‖], available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/topics/bagram/Affidavit.pdf.  
―Additionally, representatives of the Government of Afghanistan have 
access to Afghan detainees at the BTIF.‖ Gray Declaration, at 4, ¶ 10.  
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video teleconferences have been set up to allow detainees to 
meet or at least converse with their family members.
19
  
 Serious cases of detainee mistreatment occurred early in 
the BTIF‘s existence, and two detainees died from brutal 
maltreatment while in custody in 2002.
20
 The investigations 
into these deaths resulted in a number of courts-martial, some 
of which ended in convictions.
21
 Since 2005, detainees have 
been treated in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act 
(DTA), which, inter alia, restricts interrogation methods to 
those found in approved U.S. Army doctrine and sets out 
prohibited practices in terms of detainee treatment.
22
 More 
recent allegations have been made in the accounts of former 
detainees, who claim they were subjected to harsh treatment 
while being held in an interrogation facility not part of the 
Parwan Detention Facility and not open to ICRC inspection.
23
 
Currently, the Parwan Detention Facility holds approximately 
750 detainees, the majority of whom are apparently Afghan 
nationals captured within Afghanistan.
24
 A small number, 
                                                          
19
  Persons detained by the US in relation to armed conflict and the 
fight against terrorism – the role of the ICRC, supra note 18. 
20
  Golden, supra note 16. 
21
  Holly Manges Jones, New charges filed in Afghan prisoner abuse 




  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001–
1006 (2005) [hereinafter ―DTA‖], available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr359&dbname=109&., referencing Field 
Manual 34-52: Intelligence Interrogation, Department of the Army (1992) 
[hereinafter ―FM 34-52‖], available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf. The treatment standards 
are set out in FM 34-52, at 1-7 through 1-8, id.   
23
  Joshua Partlow and Julie Tate, 2 Afghans allege abuse at U.S. site, 




  Alissa J. Rubin and Sangar Rahmi, Bagram Detainees Named by 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at A6, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/world/asia/17afghan.html?scp=1&s
q=bagram%20detainees%20named%20by%20us&st=cse.  
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including Mr. al Maqaleh, are non-Afghan nationals who may 
have been brought there from third countries.
25
  
 The presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan occurs under 
one of two different legal regimes, or status of forces 
agreements (SOFAs). The status of military personnel who 
are part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the original 
U.S. mission in Afghanistan,
26
 is set out in an exchange of 
diplomatic notes between the U.S. and Afghanistan.
27
 Under 
this arrangement, Afghanistan agrees to waive criminal 
jurisdiction over these personnel, and to allow U.S. personnel 
and equipment freedom of movement into and within 
Afghanistan to conduct operations without the need to pay 
taxes and duties or to obtain visas.
28
 Specifically, U.S. 
personnel are ―accorded a status equivalent to that accorded 
to the administrative and technical staff‖ of the U.S. 
Embassy, and are immune to Afghan criminal jurisdiction.
29
 
The Parwan Detention Facility is considered an OEF mission. 
The other legal regime governing the presence of U.S. 
personnel is found in the Military Technical Agreement 
(MTA) between the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) and Afghanistan.
30
 The majority of U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan, and almost all of the international forces, are 
covered by the MTA.
31
 Under its terms, Afghanistan has 
                                                          
25
  See Gray Declaration, supra note 18, at 6-7, ¶¶ 18-20. According 
to Colonel Gray, Mr. al Maqaleh was captured in Zabul Province, 
Afghanistan.  Id. at 7, ¶ 20.  
26
  Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan – 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Oct. 2001-Mar. 2002, CENTER FOR 
MILITARY HISTORY, CHM PUB. 70-83-1 (2003).  
27
  Embassy of the United States of America, Diplomatic Note No. 
202, entered into force May 28, 2003, 2002 U.S.T. LEXIS 100 
[hereinafter ―Diplomatic Note No. 202‖]. 
28
  Id. 
29
  Id. 
30
  Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan 
(Interim Administration), Jan. 4, 2002, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, available 
at http://www.operations.mod.uk/fingal/isafmta.pdf. [hereinafter ―MTA‖]. 
31
  International Security Assistance Force, Troop numbers and 
contributions, http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/troop-contributing-
nations/index.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). [hereinafter ―Troop 
Numbers‖]. 
42 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
waived criminal, tax and customs jurisdiction over ISAF 
forces and has afforded them complete freedom of movement 
across its borders and within the country.
32
 The U.S. occupies 
Bagram Airfield under a lease with the Afghan government, 
which allows its use until the completion of the U.S. 
mission.
33
 The lease allows the U.S. to essentially sublet 
portions of the airfield for use by others, including ISAF, 
34
and the ISAF Regional Command East headquarters and 
other subordinate ISAF units are located on the airfield.
35
  
 Bagram Airfield is an austere location, and its 
concentration of military personnel and equipment make it a 
frequent target for Al Qaeda and Taliban attacks.
36
 
Accordingly, the U.S. maintains a very strong security 
posture in guarding the airfield. As U.S. forces have steadily 
increased in number during the course of the conflict, Bagram 
Airfield has grown in size and importance to the allied 
effort.
37
 Many civilian workers from Afghanistan are 
employed on the airfield, and Afghanistan retains jurisdiction 
over these individuals and other non-OEF and non-ISAF 
personnel.
38
 As noted supra, an effort has begun to transfer 
the responsibility for the Parwan Detention Facility to Afghan 
                                                          
32
  MTA, supra note 30, Art. 4, ¶ 3; Annex A, Section 1, (1)-(3). 
ISAF personnel have the status of experts on mission.  Id.  
33
  Gray Declaration, supra note 18, Exhibit 1, Lease Agreement, ¶ 4. 
34
  Id. at ¶ 3.  
35
  Troop numbers, supra note 31. ―Each nation separately controls 
access to its respective compound on the Airfield.‖ Gray Declaration, 
supra note 16, at 3, ¶ 7. 
36
  FoxNews.com, Bagram in Afghanistan Turning Into ‗Boom 
Town,‘ ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 2, 2009, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,570994,00.html (last visited Feb. 
10, 2010); Sami Yousafzai, 2 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Bagram Attack, CBS 
NEWS, June 21, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/21/terror/main5101364.shtml?ta
g=mncol;lst;1 ; Joseph Giordono, Bagram attacks highlight security 
concerns, STARS AND STRIPES, Mar. 7, 2009, 
http://www.stripes.com/news/bagram-attacks-highlight-security-concerns-
1.88970  (mortar round hits detention facility). 
37




  See Gray Declaration, supra note 18, at 3, ¶¶ 7, 8. 
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control, but the timing of the eventual turnover will likely 
depend not only on the politics of the Afghan-U.S. alliance 
but also on the need to properly train and equip Afghan 
personnel to perform their duties.
39
   
III. DETENTION REVIEW STANDARDS AND PROCESSES 
 The transnational conflict involving al Qaeda and its 
affiliates spans the globe, and has resulted in the continuing 
deployment of U.S. armed forces on a commensurate scale. 
Many commentators believe, however, that the proper way to 
deal with such non-state actors is through law enforcement 
methods and techniques rather than the use of military armed 
force.
40
  For example, some commentators and scholars 
question the use of Predator drones by the U.S. to launch 
missiles against members of al Qaeda or the Taliban outside 
Afghanistan, such as in Pakistan
41
 and particularly in 
Yemen
42
 as unlawful uses of force. This position is not 




                                                          
39
  Peter Graff, Afghans agree to take over U.S. prison at Bagram, 
REUTERS, Jan. 9, 2010, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6081IN20100109.  The Afghan 
National Army Military Police School recently graduated its first class of 
over 200 corrections officers, who are to work with U.S. soldiers at the 
Parwan Detention Facility. Bob Everdeen, First Afghan Corrections 




  See Ved. P. Nanda, International Law Implications of the United 
States‘ ‗War on Terror,‘ 37 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y, 513, 513-14 
(2009).   
41
  Alston says drone attacks on Pakistan-Afghanistan border may 
violate international law, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW NEWS, available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ALSTON_UN_GENERALASSEMBLY.  
42
  Mary Ellen O‘Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global 
War on Terror, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 325, 326 (Spring 2003).  
43
  Arguably, if such killings are not conducted by armed forces 
operating under international humanitarian law, they are extrajudicial 
killings, and possibly represent a resurrection of the practice of outlawry 
in an international context. The drones in question apparently belong to 
the CIA, are operated by CIA employees, engage targets based upon a 
CIA conducted targeting process, and are authorized by a Presidential 
44 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
 As shown by al Qaeda attacks even before September 
2001,
44
 however, the effects
45
 generated by al Qaeda and 
associated organizations can be equivalent to those ordinarily 
resulting from the use of a state military force conducting an 
armed attack. Further, al Qaeda‘s operations are decentralized 
on an international scale, and rely a great deal upon the 
internet for coordination, training, recruitment, and 
operations.
46
 These operations can all occur and effects can 
be created and facilitated at great distances beyond areas in 
which opposing forces are actually exchanging small arms 
fire within a certain set of national borders.  Concerns about 
the effects that could be created through the use of cyber-
terrorism in particular highlight how vastly different the 
                                                                                                                       
legal finding that the individuals are a continuing threat to U.S. persons or 
interests. Greg Miller, U.S. Citizen in CIA‘s Cross Hairs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
31, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/31/world/la-fg-
cia-awlaki31-2010jan31.  As noted infra note 48, a U.S. justification for 
these actions could be national self-defense, although they are not 
conducted by combatants as required by Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 43, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 609 [hereinafter ―AP I‖].  This does not mean that 
the CIA employees would be war criminals under AP I, rather, they 
would be unprivileged combatants subject to possible domestic criminal 
jurisdiction for these killings. If the common law of war were to be 
applied instead, they could possibly be tried as war criminals for these 
unprivileged killings. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 693-95 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). See also note 49 infra. 
44
  See Josh White, Al-Qaeda Suspect Says He Planned Cole Attack, 




  In the context of the developing military operational concept of 
Effects Based Approaches to Operations, an ―effect‖ is a change in the 
perception, behavior or capability of a target. Effects can be generated 
either ―kinetically,‖ such as through a missile strike, or ―non-kinetically,‖ 
through the use of information operations, for example. Jody M. Prescott, 
The Development of NATO EBAO Doctrine: Clausewitz‘s Theories and 
the Role of Law in an Evolving Approach to Operations, 27 PENN STATE 
INT‘L L. REV. 125, 127-35 (2008). 
46
  See Dorothy E. Denning, Terror‘s Web: How the Internet is 
Transforming Terrorism, 3-5, to be published in HANDBOOK ON INTERNET 
CRIME, (Y. Jewkes and M. Yar, eds. 2009), available at 
http://faculty.nps.edu/dedennin/publications/Denning-TerrorsWeb.pdf. 
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modern international security environment is, in an 
operational sense, from the one in which the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions were negotiated.
47
  In many instances, only the 
resources available to armed forces may have the capability 
to effectively engage these non-state actors who often find 
haven in troubled or failed states. Given the speed and stealth 
with which modern terrorists can generate catastrophic armed 
force-like effects, states might claim the use of armed force 
against non-state actors in areas beyond any kinetic 
battlefield to be valid measures in self-defense.
48
  
                                                          
47
  See, e.g., Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: 
Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS, Jan. 29, 2009, CRS-2-26.; Victoria Baranelsky, What is 
cyberterrorism? Even experts can‘t agree, THE HARVARD LAW RECORD, 
Nov. 6, 2009, available at http://www.hlrecord.org/news/what-is-
cyberterrorism-even-experts-can-t-agree-1.861186, See also Robert 
Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal 
and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1095 (2008). 
48
  The CIA‘s apparent use of drones to conduct such attacks is 
reported to be ―based on a legal finding signed after the Sept. 11 attacks 
by then-President George W. Bush,‖ and the standard used to decide 
whether to target an individual is whether that person is ―deemed to be a 
continuing threat to U.S. persons or interests.‖ Miller, supra note 43. The 
issue of whether national self defense is available as a legal basis for 
conducting such attacks against non-state actors within the territory of a 
third country when the non-state actors are not in effective control of third 
state territory is unsettled.  The U.S. position, as set out by U.S. State 
Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh, however, is that ―. . . [I]t is the 
considered view of this administration . . . that targeting practices, 
including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), comply with all applicable law, including the laws of 
war . . .  As recent events have shown, Al Qaeda has not abandoned its 
intent to attack the United States, and indeed continues to attack us.  Thus, 
in this ongoing conflict, the United States has the authority under 
international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, 
including lethal force, to defend itself . . .  In U.S. operations against Al 
Qaeda and its associated forces – including lethal operations conducted 
with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles – great care is taken to adhere to 
these principles [distinction and proportionality] in planning and 
execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that 
collateral damage is kept to a minimum.‖  Sheila Ward, U.S. State Dept. 
Legal Adviser [sic] Lays Out Obama Administration Position on 
engagement, ―Law of 9/11,‖ AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL 
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 Justifying such measures on this basis, however, does not 
settle questions regarding the applicable standards governing 
kinetic and non-kinetic uses of force, including detention, in 
these situations.
49
 From an empirical perspective, certain 
commentators have noted that over the course of this lengthy 
conflict there has been a convergence between the 
international humanitarian law detention review standards 
and processes that one would find in international armed 
conflict, and the human rights-oriented detention review 
standards and processes that one would find in domestic or 
even international criminal law proceedings.
50
 This 
convergence has been incremental, and responsive in large 
part to international politics and litigation in U.S. courts.
51
 
This convergence is more than just a question of politics and 
judicial decisions on the reach of executive power – treaty 
and customary international humanitarian law provide little 
detail as to what the standards and processes for detention 
review are, and therefore allow states a significant degree of 
latitude in fashioning their own measures.
52
  
 Traditionally, the degree to which detainees were entitled 
to have the status of their detentions reviewed (if at all) 
depended in large part upon the classification of the armed 
conflict during which they were being held.  In certain cases, 
however, classification itself is controversial. For purposes of 





                                                                                                                       
LAW, Mar. 25, 2010, available at 
http://www.asil.org/files/KohatAnMtg100325.pdf.   
49
  The CIA drone attacks are apparently conducted using the same 
international humanitarian law principles that military forces would use, 
such as necessity and proportionality.  Id. However, non-military 
operatives conducting such operations would appear to be unprivileged 
combatants, and the killing of another in armed conflict without having 
privileged status would appear to be a war crime under U.S. law. See 
Charlie Savage, "Deal Averts Trial in Disputed Guantanamo Case," 
NYTimes.com, Oct.25, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/us/26gitmo.html. 
50
  Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 1080-82.  
51
  Id. at 1112-22. 
52
  Id. at 1090. 
53
  ―Art 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in 
peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war 
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of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
55
 respectively, international 
armed conflicts are defined as those occurring between 
                                                                                                                       
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of 
the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by 
one of them.‖ International Committee of the Red Cross, International 
Humanitarian Law - Treaties, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 Aug.1949, 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6fef85
4a3517b75ac125641e004a9e68 (last visited Mar. 20, 2010). 
54
  ―Art 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, 
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the 
following provisions:  
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
including members of armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse 
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, 
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this 
end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at 
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to 
the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of 
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, 
humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of 
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared 
for.  
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its 




  Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter ―Geneva Convention I‖]; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
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states.
56
  Non-international armed conflicts are defined as all 
others occurring within the boundaries of a state.
57
  For 
certain state actors and commentators, the modern 
phenomenon of transnational armed groups like al Qaeda, 
capable of applying armed force on the scale of state armed 
forces, challenges the usefulness of this distinction, and 
leaves the applicable standards governing the use of armed 




 Others believe that the existence of groups such as al 
Qaeda does not mean that the current structure of 
international humanitarian law requires revision to provide an 
appropriate legal regime regulating the use of force and 
ensuring the protection of civilians in today‘s security 
environment. Rather, customary international humanitarian 
law applies when terrorists engage in international or non-
international armed conflict.
59
 This view, however, appears 
premised on the use of an unrealistically high threshold of 
what constitutes armed force, and the view that unless a 
transnational armed group is actually directly participating in 
hostilities within the borders of a country suffering a non-
                                                                                                                       
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter ―Geneva Convention II‖]; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter ―Geneva 
Convention III‖]; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter ―Geneva Convention IV‖].  
56
  International Committee of the Red Cross, International 
Humanitarian Law – Treaties and Documents, Convention (IV) relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 Aug. 1949, 
Commentary, Part I: General Provisions, Article 3 – Conflicts Not of an 
International Character, at 30, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/380-
600006?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) [hereinafter ―ICRC 
Art. 3 Commentary‖].   
57
  Id.   
58
  See, e.g., An interview with John Yoo, author of ‗The Powers of 
War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11,‘ U. CHI. 
PRESS, http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/960315in.html (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
59
  See Gabor Rona, Interesting Times For International 
Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the ‗War on Terror,‘ 27 FLETCHER 
F. WORLD AFF. 55, 57-63 (Summer/Fall 2003).  
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international armed conflict, the group and its members are 
not lawful targets of armed force.
60
  The idea that customary 
international humanitarian law should apply in circumstances 
other than international or non-international armed conflict is 
seen as ―either wittingly or unwittingly calling for expansion 
of the concept of armed conflict, or the expansion of the 
scope of application of humanitarian law beyond armed 
conflict.”
61
  This perspective presumably would then turn to 
human rights law to fill in the gaps between the two kinds of 
armed conflict recognized in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
62
  
 Review of the negotiation history of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, however, shows that the scope of armed 
conflict was understood to be greater than the eventual 
definitions of international and non-international armed 
conflict, and that the focus on these two types of armed 
conflict was not the result of a deliberate decision to define 
armed conflict. Rather, they represent the types of armed 
conflict to which the party-states were willing to apply the 
provisions of the conventions. The commentaries show that 
the original position of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) going into the diplomatic conference 
preceding the negotiations on the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
would have applied Common Article 3 across national 
borders, in ―all cases of armed conflict which are not of an 
international character, especially cases of civil war, colonial 
conflicts, or wars of religion.‖
63
 
 This position was based in part upon the ICRC‘s 
successful efforts to achieve recognition of international 
humanitarian principles in Upper Silesia by the parties to the 
                                                          
60
  See id. at 63-64.  State actors might be inclined to reject this 
approach because it complicates the application of armed force which 
might be the most effective way they have to deal with the threat of a 
modern transnational armed group like al Qaeda.  
61
  Id. at 63.  
62
  See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 1093; see also Undue 
Process, An Examination of Detention and Trials of Bagram Detainees in 




  ICRC Art. 3 Commentary, supra note 56, at 30. 
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ethnic conflict in that area after the First World War.
64
 Upper 
Silesia, a part of Germany prior to the First World War, was 
to become part of Poland under the Treaty of Versailles.
65
 
Strong German protests and open armed violence between the 
German and Polish paramilitary groups and ethnic 
populations across the respective national borders and 
throughout the region scuttled this plan,
66
 and a plebiscite 
was held in 1921 to determine the new German-Polish 
frontier.
67
 A final border was negotiated between the two 
countries, but the sovereignty of each within its portion of 
Upper Silesia was restricted by a complex League of Nations 
minority rights protection regime designed to ease the 
transition to full state sovereignty over a 15 year period.
68
  
Before it was finally resolved, the conflict in Upper Silesia 
seems to have met all of the conditions of conflict for which 
the ICRC was seeking Common Article 3 coverage. It 
involved non-regular German and Polish forces, often 
committing terrorist acts across international borders; 
primarily Protestant Germans versus primarily Catholic 
Poles, in an area in which the Germans had purposefully 
sought to increase the numbers of German inhabitants; 
German inhabitants who themselves occupied most positions 
of authority and prestige in the area and owned most of the 
more valuable economic infrastructure.
69
 
 In sum, prior to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it can be 
argued that the ICRC and the party-states were fully aware 
both in practice and in negotiation that forms of transnational 
armed conflict (and armed conflict resolution) existed that 
were consistent with neither the final Common Article 2 
                                                          
64
  Id. at 26.  The ICRC description of the conflict as a ―civil war‖ 
does not really capture the transnational character of this conflict in terms 
of support provided by Germany to the ethnic German forces and the lack 
of effective Polish control over many parts of the area. See note 66, infra. 
65
  See GEORGES KAECKENBEECK, THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT 
OF UPPER SILESIA: A STUDY IN THE WORKING OF THE UPPER SILESIAN 
SETTLEMENT 1922-1937, at 25 (1942). 
66
  RICHARD M. WATT, BITTER GLORY, POLAND AND ITS FATE 1918-
1939, at 153-60 (1998).   
67
  KAECKENBEECK, supra note 65, at 5-7.  
68
  Id. at 11-12, 25. 
69
  See WATT, supra note 66, at 153-60.  
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definition of international armed conflict nor the Common 
Article 3 definition of non-international armed conflict. The 
view that there are other forms of transnational conflict 
outside those covered by the 1949 conventions is bolstered by 
the fact that in Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, the parties agreed to expand the armed conflicts 
to which Common Article 2 would apply to ―include armed 
conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in 
the exercise of their right of self-determination.‖
70
  This was 
not a legal decision -- it was a question of international 
politics in creating new law, and practical recognition on the 
part of the international community that such armed conflicts 
were already occurring. Expanding the coverage of Common 
Article 2 did not fuel an increase in the number of such 
conflicts being fought, but it did create a legal regime which 
encouraged more humane treatment for the combatants and 
civilians involved in these conflicts.  The current conflict 
between the U.S. and its state actor allies against al Qaeda 
and its affiliated groups has led certain writers to propose the 
concept of ―transnational armed conflict,‖ that is, non-
international armed conflict not restricted to the borders of a 
particular country, as a means to bring accepted customary 
international humanitarian legal norms regarding the 




 If a conflict can be classified as international armed 
conflict, questions as to detainee status and what detention 
review procedures should be used may be resolved easily in 
many cases. For example, deciding whether a detainee should 
receive prisoner of war status under Geneva Convention III is 
                                                          
70
  International Committee of the Red Cross, International 
Humanitarian Law – Treaties & Documents, Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Part I, 
Article 1, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/470-
750004?OpenDocument.  
71
  GEOFFREY S. CORN, VICTOR M. HANSEN, DICK JACKSON, ERIC 
TALBOT JENSEN, MICHAEL W. LEWIS, JAMES A. SCHOETTLER, JR., THE 
WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR 1-36 (2009). 
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often fairly easy to determine, using fairly simple procedures. 
A status determination hearing is required only when there is 
a question as to whether an individual is a prisoner of war.
72
 
Historically, since those engaged in international armed 
conflict were ordinarily fighting for a state actor while in 
uniform and carrying military identification and because of 
the treatment incentives attaching to prisoner of war status, 
the need for such hearings in international armed conflicts 
was expected to be the exception rather than the rule.
73
 
Additionally, one would expect the error rate in making such 
determinations to be low given the objective criteria against 
which most detainees would be judged, such as the wearing 
of a uniform or possession of military identification.
74
  Less 
formal proceedings in this context have the added benefit of 
not requiring classified information being made available to 
the detainee, thereby reducing potential compromises to the 
security and integrity of intelligence.
75
 Further, because 
prisoners of war could be held until the conflict was finished, 
there wasn‘t really a need for any sort of periodic review to 
determine whether individuals should be released.  
 Implementation of an appropriate procedure to make 
these determinations is a national matter, and varies to some 
degree between different nations.
76
 If, for example, during the 
course of an international or non-international armed conflict, 
U.S. forces captured an individual who had engaged in a 
belligerent act and there were a question as to whether the 
person was a prisoner of war, the individual would be 
initially treated as a prisoner of war and then afforded a status 
                                                          
72
  Art. 5, Geneva Convention III, supra note 55. 
73
  Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 1088-89. 
74
  Id. at 1088.  During the First Gulf War, U.S. forces held 1,196 art. 
5, Geneva Convention III, hearings for individuals whose prisoner of war 
status was uncertain.  Of these, 886 individuals were found not be eligible 
for prisoner of war status. FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, CONDUCT OF THE 
PERSIAN GULF WAR, at 578 (Apr. 1992), available at 
http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf.  When factored into the 
approximately 64,000 Iraqi prisoners of war taken by the coalition forces, 
the error rate in detaining civilians as prisoners of war was about .01 
percent.  Id. at 294. 
75
  Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 1088-89. 
76
  Id. at 1091. 
2010 Detention Status Review Process 53 
determination hearing before a tribunal as required by article 
5, Geneva Convention III, (held in accordance with AR 190-
8, a joint military regulation governing status determination 
procedures).
77
 The expected minimum standard of treatment 
is specified in the regulation: all detainees receive humane 
treatment; no detainee shall suffer ―murder, torture, corporal 
punishment, mutilation, [being made a hostage], sensory 
deprivation, collective punishments, execution without trial 
by proper authority, [or any] cruel and degrading 
treatment.‖
78
  Further, all detainees are to ―be respected as 
human beings. They will be protected against all acts of 
violence to include rape, forced prostitution, assault and theft, 
insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, and reprisals of any 
kind.‖
79
 The detainee‘s case would be heard by a three 
member tribunal composed of three commissioned officers, at 
least one of whom is in the rank of major or above.
80
  The 
senior officer serves as the president of the tribunal, and a 
military attorney is ordinarily appointed as the recorder.
81
  
 The procedures afford detainees significant process 
rights. A written record is made of the proceedings, the 
proceedings are open unless security would be compromised, 
and detainees are advised of their rights beforehand, 
including the right to an interpreter.
82
 Detainees may attend 
all open sessions, call reasonably available witnesses, 
question witnesses, submit documentary evidence, address 
the tribunal, or chose to remain silent.
83
 Once the tribunal 
votes on the case, using a standard of preponderance of the 
evidence, its determination is forwarded to the primary legal 
advisor of the officer exercising general court-martial 
                                                          
77
  ARMY REGULATION 190-8, MILITARY POLICE – ENEMY PRISONERS 
OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER 
DETAINEES, Headquarters, Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air 
Force, and the Marine Corps, Oct. 1, 1997, at  ¶ 1-6a, b [hereinafter ―AR 
190-8‖]. The regulation is joint and therefore applicable to all of the 
services.    
78
  Id. at ¶ 1-5b. 
79
  Id. at ¶ 1-5c. 
80
  Id. at ¶ 1-6c.  
81
  Id. 
82
  Id. at ¶ 1-6e(2)-(5). 
83
  AR 190-8, supra note 77, at ¶ 1-6e(6)-(10). 
54 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
convening authority, so that the record can be reviewed for 
legal sufficiency if prisoner of war status is not granted.
84
  If 
determined to be a prisoner of war, and therefore under 
Common Article 2, Geneva Convention III, the individual 
could be held until the international armed conflict had 
finished.
85
  If not found to be a prisoner of war, but instead a 
civilian who should be interned for reasons of operational 
security, the person will be detained by U.S. forces under 
Geneva Convention IV, and afforded Common Article 3 
treatment.
86
 The individual could be held only as long as 
necessary, that is, for as long as the individual posed a threat 
to the U.S. forces.
87
 Otherwise, the individual would be 
released or transferred to a domestic authority. Innocent 
civilians are to be returned to their homes immediately.
88
 In 
dealing with members of transnational armed groups like al 
Qaeda, however, even a prisoner of war determination is 
potentially controversial, because nations such as the U.S. 
which have not ratified Additional Protocol I to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions may be more likely to apply the stricter 
standard under Geneva Convention III to determine whether 
an individual is entitled to prisoner of war status.
89
 
 For detainees held in non-international armed conflicts, 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions sets the 
baseline for physical treatment but does not specify how 
detainee status should be determined or reviewed.   As a 
                                                          
84
  Id. at ¶ 1-6f, g. A General Court-Martial Convening Authority is 
an individual authorized by Art. 22a, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
10 U.S.C. §822a (2008), to convene a general court-martial. These 
individuals include the President, the Secretary of Defense, commanders 
of divisions or separate brigades, and ―any other commanding officer in 
any of the armed forces when empowered by the President.‖  Id.   
85
  Id. at ¶ 1-6e(10)(a). 
86
  Id. at ¶ 1-6e(10)(d). 
87
  Accordingly, a periodic review is required in the context of the 
foreign force acting as an occupying power. Art. 78, Geneva Convention 
IV, supra note 55.  
88
  AR 190-8, supra note 77, at ¶ 1-6e(10)(c). 
89
  See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 1093-94 n.70 
(explaining the different standards under Geneva Convention IV and 
Additional Protocol I, and the U.S. position on the applicable standard); 
see also FM 34-22, supra note 20, at 1-10.  
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matter of implementing U.S. policy, the decision to apply AR 
190-8
90
 to all detainees regardless of the nature of the conflict 
provides for an expansion in the humanitarian treatment 
afforded by Common Article 3. Practically, this is consistent 
with the aim of the theory of transnational armed conflict, but 
some might argue that this expands the scope of armed 
conflict beyond what international humanitarian treaty law, 
and possibly customary law, allows.
91
  Accordingly, some 
might argue that the process afforded under AR 190-8, 
although greater than that expected under international law in 
cases of international armed conflict, is not sufficient from an 
international human rights law perspective for the detention 
of individuals who are believed to be a part of al Qaeda.  
 The fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates has gone on 
since September 2001 and shows no sign of ending soon.
92
 
Arguments for detaining individuals who are part of or who 
provide support to such organizations for extended periods of 
time find strong justification in the number of released 
Guantanamo detainees who have made their way back to the 
battlefield.
93
  The Bush Administration‘s decision to create 
the detention facility at Guantanamo to hold individuals 
believed to be part of or to have supported al Qaeda in its 
attacks against the U.S. was based in large part on the 
assessment that non-U.S. national detainees would not have 
access to U.S. courts to challenge their continued detention or 
potential trials before military commissions, because rights 
under the U.S. Constitution would not extend to them on the 
territory of a foreign state.
94
  In 2004, the U.S. Supreme 
                                                          
90
  AR 190-8, supra note 77. 
91
  See Rona, supra note 59, at 57-63.  
92
  See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 1100.   
93
  See Amanda Scott, Pentagon: More Former Guantanamo 
Detainees Returning to Battlefield, VOANEWS, Jan. 14, 2009, available at 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-01-14-voa12-
68809502.html.  Many released detainees have not returned to the 
battlefield. See Gavin Lee, Guantanamo Guards Reunited with Ex-
Inmates, BBC NEWS MAG., Jan. 12, 2010, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8452937.stm.  
94
  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (quoting a memorandum written by Deputy Assistant 
Attorneys General Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo which indicated 
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Court found otherwise in Rasul v. Bush, in which it held that 
because the habeas corpus statute did not distinguish between 
U.S. citizens and non-citizens, and because of the special 
degree of control exercised by the U.S. over Guantanamo, 
federal courts had jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from 
non-citizen Guantanamo detainees.
95
  This right, albeit on 
constitutional grounds, was later reaffirmed in Boumediene, 
which cleared the path for Guantanamo detainees to 
challenge their detention in federal courts using the right of 
habeas corpus, despite statutory amendments to the contrary 
in the Military Commission Act (MCA).
96
       
IV. BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH 
 Mr. Lakhdar Boumediene, a native of Algeria, 
immigrated to Bosnia during the time of the Wars of 
Yugoslavian Succession. In the fall of 2001, on suspicion that 
he and five other former Algerian nationals were plotting to 
bomb the U.S. and British embassies in Sarajevo, the six 
were detained and investigated by Bosnian law enforcement 
and judicial authorities. They were released for lack of 
evidence, but subsequently detained by U.S. personnel and 
brought to Guantanamo Naval Station.
97
  After a complex 
appellate history involving the six men‘s petitions for writs of 
habeas corpus, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
2007 after it had originally denied review only three months 
earlier.
98
  There were four primary issues before the court: 
                                                                                                                       
Guantanamo Naval Station was outside U.S. federal court jurisdiction); 
see also CBSNews.com, Obama Upends Bush, Will Close Guantanamo, 
Jan. 22, 2009, 
http://cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/22/politics/100days/main4746421.sht
ml (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).  
95
  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004). 
96
  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 
97




    See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733-34. 
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1.  Did the MCA‘s
99
 amendment of 28 U.S.C. 
§2241 to remove habeas corpus jurisdiction 
from the federal courts for detainee cases like 




2. If the MCA did effect this change, was it in 




3. If this change was unconstitutional, did the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) 
procedures set out in the DTA
102
 provide an 




4. If these procedures were inadequate, could 
Boumediene and his fellow petitioners 
challenge these procedures without having 
first gone through them? 
104
  
The Court found that the language of §7 of the MCA 
amended the statutory right of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 
§2241 to prevent the hearing of even pending habeas corpus 
petitions from detainees held at Guantanamo, and that this 
was confirmed by the legislative history.
105
  This amendment, 
however, was unconstitutional. In reviewing the history of 
Guantanamo, the Court found that the base was a remnant of 
the U.S. occupation of Cuba after the Spanish-American War 
in 1898.
106
 Through a lease executed between the U.S. and 
the newly independent Cuba in 1903, the U.S. disclaimed 
formal sovereignty over the base, but was allowed to exercise 
                                                          
99
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e) (Supp. 2007). 
100
   Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 735-39 (2008). 
101
   Id. at 739-40. 
102
   DTA, supra note 22, at §§ 1001–1006.   
103
   Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770-73. 
104
  Id. at 768.   
105
  Id. at 736, 760.   
106
  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 752-53 (2008). 
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―complete jurisdiction and control.‖
107
 In 1934, the two 
countries entered into a treaty which effectively gave Cuba 
―no rights as a sovereign until the parties agree to 
modification of the 1903 Lease Agreement or the United 
States abandons the base.‖
108
 In keeping with the holding in 
Eisentrager v. Johnson,
109
 a detainee case from post-World 
War II Occupation Germany, the Court looked to the 
objective degree of control exercised by the U.S. over the 
naval station, and found that the U.S. ―continued to maintain 
the same plenary control it had enjoyed since 1898.‖
110
 In the 
Court‘s view, therefore, ―Guantanamo Bay . . . is no transient 
possession. In every practical sense, Guantanamo is not 
abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the United 
States.‖
111
  Looking again to Eisentrager to help analyze a 
situation in which non-citizens are claiming the right of 
habeas corpus and the U.S. did not have de jure sovereignty 
over the detention site, the Court found that  
at least three factors are relevant in 
determining the reach of the Suspension 
Clause: (1) The citizenship and status of the 
detainee and the adequacy of the process 
through which that status determination was 
made; (2) the nature of the sites where 
apprehension and then detention took place; 
and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in 




 Unlike the petitioners in Eisentrager, Boumediene and his 
fellow petitioners contested their status, which had not been 
determined through the rigorous adversarial proceedings 
                                                          
107
  Id. at 745-46 (citing Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval 
Stations, art III, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418).  
108
  Id. at 746 (citing Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, art III, 
May 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 1683, T.S. No. 866). 
109
  Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769-79 (1950); see also 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762-64 (2008).  
110
  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 752. 
111
  Id. at 755. 
112
  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 753 (2008). 
2010 Detention Status Review Process 59 
affording significant due process.
113
 The Court noted that 
―the procedural protections afforded the detainees in the 
CSRT hearings [were] far more limited, and we conclude, fall 
well short of the procedures and adversarial mechanisms that 
would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review.‖
114
 
Interestingly, the adequacy of the status determination 
process was also used later in the Court‘s analysis once it had 
found that the Suspension Clause applied to Guantanamo,
115
 
but at that point adequacy was addressed to determine 
whether the CSRT process including the review of its 
findings by the Circuit Court provided an adequate substitute 
for habeas corpus proceedings.
116
 At this initial stage of the 
Court‘s analysis, however, the analytical function of 
evaluating process adequacy was geared toward determining 
whether the existing processes obviated the need for habeas 
corpus review.
117
 As to the nature of the detention site, the 
Court found Guantanamo was very different from Occupation 
Germany.
118
 The U.S. shared control of Occupation Germany 
with the other Allies, with the intent to return it to civilian 
German control; its control was ―neither absolute nor 
indefinite,‖ as compared to U.S. control of Guantanamo.
119
  
Further, the Court found no significant negative impacts in 
allowing the Guantanamo petitioners the writ.  Unlike 
Occupation Germany, with the continuing threat of irregular 
enemy military action and the need for massive 
reconstruction and aid, the Court noted that  
[t]he United States Naval Station at 
Guantanamo Bay consists of 45 square miles 
of land and water. The base has been used, at 
                                                          
113
  Id.  
114
  Id. at 754 (the CSRT process potentially provided less process 
than that required by AR 190-8, in appearing to allow greater use of 
coerced statements, for example); see also Chesney & Goldsmith, supra 
note 47, at 1112 n.156 (2008).    
115
  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766-68 (2008). 
116
  Id. at 753. 
117
  Id. at 753, 756.  
118
  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 754-55 (2008). 
119
  Id. at 754. 
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various points, to house migrants and refugees 
temporarily. At present, other than the 
detainees themselves, the only long-term 
residents are American military personnel, 
their families, and a small number of workers. 
[citation omitted]. The detainees have been 
deemed enemies of the United States. At 
present, dangerous as they may be if released, 
they are contained in a secure prison facility 




 Finally, the Court noted that there was ―no indication . . . 
that adjudicating a habeas corpus petition would cause 
friction with the host government.‖
121
 Cuban courts were 
without jurisdiction over the U.S. military personnel or the 
detainees, and the U.S. was not accountable to another 
―sovereign for its acts on the base‖ so long as it met the terms 
of the lease.
122
 The Court noted that ―[w]ere that not the case, 
or if the detention facility were located in an active theater of 
war, arguments that issuing the writ would be ‗impracticable 
or anomalous‘ would have more weight.‖
123
  The 
constitutional right to habeas corpus was therefore available 
to those detained at Guantanamo unless appropriately 
suspended – something the MCA ―[did] not purport‖ to 
effect.
124
   
 The Court then turned to the issue of whether the DTA 
provided an adequate substitute for habeas corpus procedures. 
Without deciding the merits of petitioners‘ argument that the 
CSRT mechanism was deficient in providing sufficient due 
process under the DTA, the Court found that the limitations 
placed upon the Circuit Court of Appeal‘s review of CSRT 
                                                          
120
  Id. at 755. 
121
  Id.  
122
  Id. at 755-57. 
123
  Id.   
124
  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 756 (2008). 
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determinations rendered such reviews inadequate.
125
 In 
particular, the Court noted  
[f]or the writ of habeas corpus, or its 
substitute, to function as an effective and 
proper remedy in this context, the court that 
conducts the habeas proceeding must have the 
means to correct errors that occurred during 
the CSRT proceedings. This includes some 
authority to assess the sufficiency of the 
Government‘s evidence against the detainee. It 
also must have the authority to admit and 
consider relevant exculpatory evidence that 
was not introduced during the earlier 




 Because the DTA limited the Court of Appeals‘ review to 
determining whether the CSRT complied with the ―standards 
and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense...‖
127
 
and the legislative history showed that this limited degree of 
judicial review was precisely what the Congress intended, the 
Court found this standard of error correction authority had 
not been met.
128
  Further, because of the circumstances of the 
case, including the length of time that the petitioners had 
already spent in detention, the Court found that they need not 
challenge these procedures in the D.C. Circuit Court before 
pursuing their habeas corpus actions in the District Court.
129
 
Accordingly, the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court was 
reversed and remanded. Since the Court‘s decision, 
Guantanamo detainees have in general been very successful 
in their habeas corpus litigation, in large part because the 
government has been unable to show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that they were part of al Qaeda or associated 
                                                          
125
  Id. at 767-268. 
126
  Id. at 764. 
127
  Id. at 768. 
128
  Id. at 768. 
129
  Id. at 769. 
62 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
groups.
130
 This includes Boumediene, who at present has 
found a home in France, where he has been joined by his 
family.
131
 Likely encouraged by these results, detainees at the 
Parwan Detention Facility are seeking to use habeas corpus 
proceedings to challenge their detention in Afghanistan, 
arguing that the Parwan Detention Facility is equivalent to 
Guantanamo under the holding in Boumediene.
132
  
V. AL MAQALEH V. GATES, DISTRICT COURT OPINION 
 In 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia applied the Boumediene analysis to habeas corpus 
petitions brought by four detainees now presumably at the 
Parwan Detention Facility.  Each detainee was a foreign 
national apparently captured outside Afghanistan and brought 
to the BTIF, where they had been held for at least six years at 
the time of the court‘s hearing of the case.
133
  Two of the 
                                                          
130
  Del Quentin Wilber, 2008 habeas ruling may pose snag as U.S. 
weighs indefinite Guantanamo detentions, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2010, at 
A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/12?AR2010021204911.html?hpid=moreheadl
ines.  For example, in its decision in Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 
63 (D.D.C. 2009), the D.C. District Court rejected ―substantial support‖ 
or ―direct support‖ of al Qaeda or the Taliban as proper bases for 
continued detention, although the court found evidence of this could be 
relevant to determining whether an individual belonged to those 
organizations or directly participated in hostilities.  Id. at 70.  
Interestingly, the government position before the district court on 
authority to detain was that the rules applicable to international armed 
conflict should apply by analog.  Id. at 67.  The district court noted that 
the AUMF as interpreted in caselaw includes the power to detain, and that 
this was ―consistent with the law of war principles governing non-
international conflicts.‖  Id. at 70.  Arguably, the district court implicitly 
recognizes the concept of transnational armed conflict as an analytical 
tool to help it find the rules that should apply in what is strictly neither an 
international nor a non-international armed conflict.  
131
  France accepts Boumediene in action to expedite closure of 
Guantanamo, 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/about/news/newsDetail.aspx?news=1586 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2010).  
132
  Joint Brief for the Petitioners-Appellees, at 26-31, Al Maqaleh v. 
Gates, No. 09-5265, 2010 WL 2010783 (C.A.D.C. 2010).  
133
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207 (D.D.C. 2009).    
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detainees, including Mr. al Maqaleh, claimed to be Yemeni, 
one claimed he was Tunisian, and one claimed to be an 
Afghan.
134
  The district court first noted that Boumediene had 
invalidated the MCA‘s elimination of habeas corpus 
jurisdiction for petitions by detainees only with regard to 
Guantanamo.
135
 Accordingly, the issue for the court was 
―whether the statute withdrawing habeas corpus jurisdiction 
is constitutional as applied to the[ ] detainees held at 
Bagram,‖ given the degree of U.S. control over the airfield 
(essentially the same issue that confronted the Court in 
Boumediene).
136
  For purposes of analysis, the district court 
separated the three factors that the U.S. Supreme Court had 
looked at in evaluating whether the Suspension Clause was 
applicable to Guantanamo into six factors: detainee 
citizenship, detainee status, nature of the apprehension site, 
nature of the detention site, adequacy of the status 
determination process and ―practical obstacles inherent in 
resolving the petitioner‘s entitlement to the writ.‖
137
 It then 
added a seventh factor to be considered in evaluating the 
others: the reasonableness of ―the length of a petitioner‘s 
detention without adequate review.‖
138
  As to the first three 
factors, the district court found that the Parwan Detention 
Facility petitioners were the same as the Guantanamo 
petitioners.
139
 None were U.S. citizens, all had been 
determined to be enemy combatants, and all had been 
apprehended outside the U.S.
140
  The district court found that 
the U.S. Supreme Court had not really analyzed these factors 
to any great depth in Boumediene, and therefore found only 
the issue of the apprehension site to be important. Unlike the 
situation in Guantanamo, where all the detainees had been 
apprehended outside the base but then brought there, the 
Parwan Detention Facility contained both detainees like the 
                                                          
134
  Id. at 209. 
135
  Id. at 214.   
136
  Id.  
137
  Id. at 215. 
138
  Id. at 216.  
139
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 218 (D.D.C. 2009). 
140
  Id.   
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petitioners and individuals taken in Afghanistan itself. The 
district court found this weighed in the petitioners‘ favor.
141
  
A  Site of Detention 
 The district court then focused on the three remaining, 
and in its opinion, dispositive factors. Regarding the nature of 
the detention site, the district court examined the legal status 
of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, and found that the nature 
of U.S. control at Bagram was essentially the same as at 
Guantanamo – that is, ―near-total operational control.‖
142
 The 
district court based this finding on the terms of the lease for 
Bagram, which provided the U.S. with exclusive use during 
its occupancy, as well as assignment and reversion authority, 
and on the freedom from Afghan control afforded by the 
exchange of diplomatic notes defining the status of U.S. 
forces in Afghanistan.
143
  Although the district court noted 
that U.S. control over Bagram was less plenary than that 
found at Guantanamo,
144
 and that Bagram could not be 
considered ―not abroad,‖
145
 it found the freedom of 
movement and the immunity from host nation criminal 
jurisdiction manifested the very high ―objective degree of 
control‖ enjoyed by the U.S. at Bagram, in the district court‘s 
words, ―practically absolute.‖
146
 This factor, in the district 
                                                          
141
  Id. at 221. 
142
  Id. at 222.  
143
  Id. at 222-23. 
144
  Id.  
145
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 231 (D.D.C. 2009). 
146
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 223 (D.D.C. 2009).  
Often, the district court focuses on the degree of control exercised at the 
detention facility itself to substantiate its finding of U.S. control sufficient 
to trigger application of the Suspension Clause, rather than that exercise 
over the airfield as a whole.  See, e.g., id. at 223-24.  In Boumediene, the 
U.S. Supreme Court did not focus on the control exercised at the 
Guantanamo detention facility in assessing whether U.S. control was of a 
degree to make it part of U.S. territory – rather the court looked to the 
installation as a whole. See note 115, supra. It is illogical to suggest that a 
nation responsible for running a detention facility in active theater of 
combat would accept anything less than total operational control for 
security and safety purposes – but that does not necessarily make it part of 
the United States for purposes of the Suspension Clause. Further, the 
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 This finding appears to be based on two mistaken 
premises. First, the district court appears to have confused 
operational control, which may be quite extensive but is 
ordinarily temporary and mission-related, with objective 
control in a continuing de facto sovereign sense.  The status 
of forces arrangement grants a limited waiver of Afghan 
authority over OEF forces for mission purposes, as these 
agreements typically do. This waiver is based on the Afghan-
U.S. alliance, and although it gives great latitude to OEF 
forces conducting their missions, it does not for example 
waive continuing Afghan jurisdiction over local workers or 
even U.S. contractors at the airfield.
148
  Further, the U.S. 
occupancy of Bagram is not intended to be permanent,
149
 and 
at time of the district court‘s decision had existed for less 
than a decade.  A status of forces arrangement between two 
countries is a very real manifestation of the host nation‘s 
sovereignty, and the mission focus of the limited waiver of 
jurisdiction. Given the ongoing conflict with al Qaeda and the 
Taliban, the latitude afforded OEF forces is necessarily 
greater for example than that accorded to NATO allies who 
maintain military establishments within the U.S. under the 
                                                                                                                       
district court appears to have misread the factual record when it states that 
―it is the United States, not U.S. allies, that detains people at the Bagram 
Theater Internment Facility and that operates (and hence fully controls) 
that prison facility and its occupants, which was not the case at 
Landsberg.‖  Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224.  Landsberg Prison was 
designated as War Criminal Prison No. 1 by the U.S. Army commander in 
Germany in 1946, it housed individuals convicted by various U.S. 
tribunals, and it was operated by the U.S. until it was returned to German 
control in 1958.  See also Case Closed, TIME, June 18, 1951, (execution 
of SS officers convicted by U.S. tribunals at the direction of Landsberg‘s 
U.S. commandant) available at 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,814963.html (last visited Mar. 
23, 2010).  
147
  Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 231. 
148
  Id. at 223. 
149
  Id. at 224-25; see Brief for Respondent-Appellants at 18-21, Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265, 2010 WL 2010783 (C.A.D.C. 2010). 
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NATO Status of Forces Agreement,
150
 but very similar in 
many of the covered subject areas, such as taxation, 
importation of equipment, and the leasing of host nation 
facilities..
151
   
 This confusion is also shown by the district court‘s 
rejection of the government‘s argument that extending the 
reach of the Suspension Clause to Bagram was tantamount to 
holding that the Constitution applied world-wide,
152
 despite 
having earlier noted the government‘s argument that the 
degree of control exercised by the U.S. over Bagram was 
consistent with that found at any overseas U.S. base.
153
 
According to the district court, in keeping with Boumediene, 
―[t]he Suspension Clause only applies where the United 
States has the degree of control over a site that would permit 
meaningful review of an individual‘s detention following a 
‗reasonable amount of time.‘‖
154
 Not only does the language 
in Boumediene not support such a standard, but given the 
world-wide dispersal of U.S. bases overseas, this standard in 
effect realizes the government‘s concern regarding the 
breadth of the Suspension Clause‘s potential application 
under such a holding. The second mistaken premise appears 
to be the district court‘s determination that setting out a 
spectrum of control using the conditions at Guantanamo and 
                                                          
150
  Compare Diplomatic Note 202, ¶2, supra note 27 (―The Embassy 
proposes, without prejudice to the conduct of ongoing military operations 
by the United States, that such personnel be accorded a status equivalent 
to that‖ given to the embassy‘s administrative and technical staff under 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations), with Agreement 
Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of 
Their Forces, London, June 19, 1951 (hereinafter ―NATO SOFA‖), art. 
VIIb (―The authorities of the receiving state will have jurisdiction over the 
members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with 
respect to offences committed within the territory of the receiving State 
and punishable by the law of that State.‖).  
151
  Compare Diplomatic Note 202, ¶¶ 2-6, 7-8, supra note 27, with 
NATO SOFA, arts. III-VI, IIX-XIV, supra note 150.  
152
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 231 (D.D.C. 2009).  
153
  Id. at 222.  Again, the district court appears to have confused 
―near-total operational control,‖ which would ordinarily apply to any U.S. 
overseas base, with the very special degree of practically sovereign 
control exercised by the U.S. over Guantanamo.  
154
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 231 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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the Landsberg Prison in Occupied Germany in which the 
Eisentrager petitioners were held as its terminus points was 
useful in evaluating conditions at Bagram. In sum, the district 
court found the control exercised by the U.S. at the Parwan 
Detention Facility to be much more like that at Guantanamo 
than in Germany.
155
 The question that should have been 
addressed is not where the Parwan Detention Facility falls on 
such a spectrum, but whether the degree of control exercised 
by the U.S. is such that the Parwan Detention Facility 
essentially becomes U.S. territory to which the Suspension 
Clause would apply.   
B. Adequacy of Process 
 The district court noted a number of features of the 
Bagram status review process that made it less rigorous than 
even the Guantanamo CSRT process found insufficient by the 
Supreme Court, and found  it therefore inadequate.
156
 These 
deficiencies included ‗no recourse to a neutral decision-
maker‖ on status determinations; no access to even a personal 
representative before the hearing board for the petitioners; 
only an opportunity to submit a written statement to the board 
rather than to speak; no right for the petitioners to see the 
evidence which inculpated them; and uncertain evidentiary 
standards.
157
 The district court found this factor ―strongly 
favors petitioners‘ claim for habeas protection.‖
158
  The 
district court rejected the government‘s argument that 
adequacy of the status determination process was only 
relevant once it was determined that the degree of U.S. 
                                                          
155
  Id. at 224.  
156
  Id. at 227. 
157
  Id. at 226-27.  Under the Enemy Combatant Review Board 
process, status reviews were ordinarily conducted within 75 days of 
capture and every six months thereafter. The Board was composed of five 
commissioned officers who evaluated each case and made a majority vote 
recommendation to the general court-martial convening authority. 
Decisions were ―based on information derived from a variety of sources, 
including classified intelligence and testimony from individuals involved 
in the capture and interrogation of the detainee.‖  Gray Declaration, supra 
note 18, at 4-5.   
158
  Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 226-27. 
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control over the detention site was so great that it became 
U.S. territory to which the Suspension Clause would apply.
159
 
The district noted that the Boumediene opinion specifically 
―enumerated ‗adequacy of the process‘ as one of the factors 
that determine whether the Suspension Clause applies.‖
160
  
 Although the district court was correct that status 
determination process adequacy was a specific factor 
considered by the Boumediene Court in assessing whether the 
Suspension Clause should apply, it would appear that the 
district court erred in appreciating the limited function that 
analysis of this factor had in the initial part of the 
Boumediene analysis. The Boumediene Court looked at it first 
only to see whether there was no need for habeas corpus 
review, not to determine whether in fact the Suspension 
Clause should apply.
161
 That deeper analysis of the 
sufficiency of the process occurred only after the special 
nature of the U.S. jurisdiction over Guantanamo had been 
established.
162
   
C. Practical Obstacles 
 With regard to the practical obstacles that would militate 
against extending the Suspension Clause to the Parwan 
Detention Facility, the district court noted that Bagram was in 
an active war zone and often the subject of insurgent 
attack.
163
 However, the high degree of control exercised by 
the U.S. over the base meant that it would be able to conduct 
rigorous status determination procedures as it had 
traditionally done in areas of operations, and that modern 
video teleconferencing capabilities reduced the need for 
moving detainees to habeas corpus hearings.
164
 Further, the 
                                                          
159
  Id. at 226. 
160
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 226 (D.D.C. 2009). 
161
  Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 765-67 (2008).  Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court had noted deficiencies in the Guantanamo CSRT 
process, it had based its finding of the entire process‘s inadequacy on the 
nature of the review afforded to the Circuit Court in its review of the 
CSRT‘s status determination rather than the CSRT process itself.  
162
  Id. at 764-68. 
163
  Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 228. 
164
  Id.  
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extra burden of dealing with the logistical challenges would 
fall primarily upon the ―lawyers and administrative personnel 
involved, not on those who would otherwise be on the 
battlefield.‖ 
165
 Any witnesses, for example, would have 
information dating back six years to the time of the 
petitioners‘ apprehensions, and therefore would not involve 
personnel currently involved in operations.
166
 Further, 
potential friction between the U.S. and the host government 
would be avoided by not affording the one Afghan petitioner, 
Wazir, the ability to contest his detention through a habeas 
corpus proceeding.
167
 The district court also noted the length 
of time which the petitioners had been held, and that if the 
Government was ―truly concerned about the logistical 
obstacles and burdens associated with affording habeas 
review to these few petitioners at Bagram, transfer to a non-
battlefield location remains an option.‖
168
 
 The district court appears to underestimate the logistical 
difficulties that would flow from holding habeas corpus 
hearings in a war zone. Even if lawyers and administrative 
personnel are primarily the ones directly involved in such 
hearings, and the number of potential petitioners is small 
because the holding in al Maqaleh only applies to non-
Afghan nationals apprehended outside Afghanistan, these 
additional personnel will require logistical and life support, 
and additional security. Setting up lengthy video 
teleconferences impacts bandwidth required for actual 
combat operations. Further, potential petitioners would have 
little to lose were they to falsely claim that they had been 
apprehended outside Afghanistan – under al Maqaleh they 
would appear to at least get a habeas hearing. The district 
court‘s decision also appears to unrealistically downplay the 
possibility of friction between the U.S. and Afghanistan 
regarding the use of a U.S. civilian judicial hearing 
concerning detainees of mutual security concern. The flow of 
foreign fighters into Afghanistan from across the Muslim 
                                                          
165
  Id.  
166
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 229 (D.D.C. 2009). 
167
  Id. at 230. 
168
  Id. at 230, n.21.   
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world is well documented,
169
 as is the attendant flow of 
financial and materiel resources to al Qaeda and the Taliban 
insurgents.
170
 The foreign fighters in particular are viewed as 
particularly brutal in their tactics against Afghan civilians, a 
perception which is quite telling given the demonstrated 
disregard for civilian casualties by the Taliban.
171
 Regardless 
of their nationalities and sites of apprehension, Afghanistan 
could in fact have a pronounced security interest in the 
Bagram petitioners, as well as a perception of Afghan 
sovereignty being disrespected through the use of habeas 




D. District Court‘s Conclusion 
After evaluating and balancing all of these factors, the 
district court found ―that the Bagram detainees in these cases 
are virtually identical to the Guantanamo detainees in 
Boumediene, and the circumstances of their detention are 
quite similar as well.‖
173
 The district court included its 
seventh factor, the length of time the detainees had been held 
without an adequate detention status hearing, in its 
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analysis.
174
 The district court noted that in keeping with ―the 
kind of practical, functional analysis the Supreme Court has 
mandated in Boumediene,‖ if potential friction with 
Afghanistan were too great, or the government decided to 
―provide greater process in determining the status of the 
detainees, the balance of factors could shift against extension 
of the Suspension Clause.‖
175
 The existing status 
determination procedures, however, gave less process than 
even that afforded to Guantanamo detainees, and therefore 
were not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 
proceedings. In view of its balancing of the Boumediene 
factors, the district court held ―that the Suspension Clause 
extends to three of the four petitioners at Bagram,‖ and the 




E. Assessment of the District Court‘s Holding 
 Although the district court used the factors set out in 
Boumediene to determine whether the Suspension Clause 
reached the Parwan Detention Facility, its methodology in 
assessing these factors appears inconsistent with that used by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. First, although the district court 
properly assessed the first three factors in the Boumediene 
analysis to not be of great significance, it did appear to 
substantially value these factors in its determination that the 
Guantanamo detainees and the Parwan Detention Facility 
detainees were practically identical. This high degree of 
identity appears to have been important in the district court‘s 
decision to allow the extension of the Suspension Clause to 
the non-Afghan petitioners. Second, the district court appears 
to have improperly weighted the adequacy-of-process factor 
in the threshold determination as to whether the Suspension 
Clause applied in this case. Third, the district court did not 
assess the nature of the detention site properly. The 
Boumediene opinion relied upon the Eisentrager example of 
Landsberg Prison in an illustrative fashion, not as a definitive 
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176
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terminus on a spectrum against which to compare detention 
sites. In having done so, the district court misread the 
importance the U.S. Supreme Court placed on the very 
special nature of de facto sovereign control maintained by the 
U.S. over Guantanamo in finding that the Suspension Clause 
extended there. Fourth, the district court appears to have 
glossed over the significance of the practical obstacles in 
holding habeas corpus hearings for detainees located in a war 
zone, both in terms of the logistical burdens on the deployed 
units who are already strained to provide adequate life 
support services for personnel and fight Al Qaeda at the same 
time, and the potential friction between the U.S. and 
Afghanistan that could result from granting even non-Afghan 
detainees the right to present habeas corpus petitions to U.S. 
civilian courts. For these reasons, the district court‘s decision 
should be overturned on appeal.
177
  
 Obscured in part perhaps through its inclusion as an 
evaluation factor among several, the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 
concern that individuals could be detained by executive order 
indefinitely without the benefit of an impartial hearing to 
determine their status should not be overlooked.  Extending 
habeas protection to just a small class of detainees within the 
larger detainee population at the Parwan Detention Facility 
on the basis of non-Afghan nationality, while allowing those 
who are of Afghan nationality to be subject to indefinite 
detention would not seem to meet this concern.
178
  As 
                                                          
177
  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 149, at 30-52.  In its brief to 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the U.S. noted that an additional factor 
that weighed against extending habeas corpus to detainees at the Parwan 
Detention Facility was the potential for invocation of federal courts‘ 
habeas corpus jurisdiction simply by falsely claiming that they had been 
captured outside of Afghanistan.  Id. at 21-22.  
178
  The district court noted that although ―such a result would be 
anomalous,‖ it would be even more anomalous to ―permit the Executive 
‗to switch the Constitution on or off at will‘ merely by deciding who will 
be held where,‖ that is, to purposefully hold detainees in particular 
locations to avoid application of the Suspension Clause. Al Maqaleh, 604 
F. Supp. 2d at 216.  It is arguably within the government‘s discretion in 
combat operations abroad to determine where it will hold detainees.  See 
Munaf v. Geren, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2218 (2008); whether particular 
constitutional rights accrue to such detainees is a separate question.  
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Boumediene suggests through its weighing of the adequacy-
of- process factor, and as the district court noted in its 
conclusion in al Maqaleh, the executive has both the ability 
and the flexibility to devise a process which meets the 
Court‘s concerns as to the substance of what is required 
process-wise to detain individuals in the current, transnational 
armed conflict.  Perhaps acting on these implicit invitations, 
the Obama Administration has recently put into effect a 
revised status determination process for detainees held at the 
Parwan Detention Facility.
179
   
VI.  AL MAQALEH V. GATES, CIRCUIT COURT OPINION 
 The D.C. Circuit Court began its analysis by reviewing 
the legislative and litigative history of the issue of habeas 
corpus for detainees held as a result of the conflict with al 
Qaeda and its affiliates up to the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Boumediene.
180
  Rather than apply the six or 
seven factors that the district court had used in its analysis, 
the circuit court instead focused on the three factors stated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court: detainee citizenship and status, and 
the adequacy of the process by which status was determined; 
nature of the apprehension and detention sites; and what 
practical obstacles complicated the resolution of whether the 
detainee was entitled to the writ.
181
  Before applying 
Boumediene to the petitioners‘ case, however, the circuit 
court first disposed of what it viewed as the untenable 
extreme positions advocated by each party as to whether 
jurisdiction existed. As to the government‘s position that 
Boumediene only applied to areas of de facto sovereignty 
such as Guantanamo, the circuit court noted that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had not decided Eisentrager solely on the 
basis of sovereignty, but also upon the practicalities of the 
situation in Occupied Germany – a method of analysis 
continued in Boumediene.
182
 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                          
179
  See Detainee Review Procedures, supra note 10. 
180
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265, 2010 WL 2010783, at *2-8 
(C.A.D.C. 2010). 
181
  Id. at *8. 
182
  Id.  
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in Boumediene had ―rejected the Government‘s reading of 
Eisentrager because the meaning of the word ‗sovereignty‘ in 
the Eisentrager opinion was not limited to the ‗narrow 
technical sense‘ of the word and could be read ‗to connote the 
degree of control the military asserted over the facility.‘‖
183
 
Finally in Boumediene, the U.S. Supreme Court had 
concluded that such a limited interpretation of Eisentrager 
would be inconsistent with the ―functional approach to 
questions of territoriality‖ it had taken in cases both before 
and after Eisentrager.
184
 The D.C. Circuit Court likewise 
rejected petitioners‘ argument that leasing a military base 
would be ―sufficient to trigger the extraterritorial application 
of the Suspension Clause‖ or at least the apprehension and 
detention situs factor.
185
 The circuit court noted that counsel 
for the petitioners had been unable at oral argument to 
distinguish Bagram Airfield from other military installations 
in this regard, and that adopting this position would 
potentially extend the Suspension Clause not just to military 




In applying the first Boumediene factor, the circuit court 
found that as to citizenship, status, and status determination, 
the petitioners were no different than the detainees at 
Guantanamo – that is, they had been labeled as enemy aliens 
through a process that afforded even less process than the 
inadequate Guantanamo status determination procedures 
had.
187
 This factor therefore weighed in petitioners‘ favor.
188
   
As to the second factor, the nature of the detention situs, the 
circuit court found the degree of de facto U.S. control over 
Bagram Airfield to be much less than that which exists over 
Guantanamo, given the U.S. relationship with Afghanistan 
and the lack of intent to make permanent use of the 
                                                          
183
  Id.  
184
  Id.  
185
  Id. at *9. 
186
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265, 2010 WL 2010783, at *9 
(C.A.D.C. 2010). 
187
  Id. at *10. 
188
  Id. 
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airfield.
189
  Although not determinative in the circuit court‘s 
view, this factor weighed in favor of the Government.
190
 The 
third and final Boumediene factor, ―the practical obstacles 
inherent in resolving the prisoner‘s entitlement to the writ,‖ 
also weighed in the Government‘s favor. The circuit court 
noted that unlike Occupied Germany in Eisentrager, 
Afghanistan was an active combat theater, and therefore ―all 
of the attributes of a facility exposed to the vagaries of war 
are present in Bagram.‖
191
 The circuit court also found that 
conducting habeas hearings for Bagram detainees would have 
significant negative operational impacts,
192
 and could also 
tend to aggravate relations with Afghanistan.
193
  Weighing all 
three factors, and especially the third factor,
194
 the circuit 
court concluded that ―the writ does not extend to the Bagram 
confinement in an active theater of war in a territory under 
neither the de facto nor de jure sovereignty of the United 
States and within the territory of another de jure 
sovereign.‖
195
   
Although the circuit court‘s application of the 
Boumediene factors appears less complex than the district 
court‘s approach, in essence the district court focused on the 
same points as being important: adequacy of status 
determination, nature of detention situs, and practical 
obstacles to holding habeas hearings.  The circuit court‘s 
approach in applying the factors takes a more holistic 
approach to the facts, however, and is more in keeping with 
the functional approach set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Eisentrager and Boumediene. For example, where the district 
court looked only to the degree of operational control the 
U.S. exercises over Bagram Airfield to determine that it was 
basically the same as Guantanamo, the circuit court looked at 
the broader picture of the relationship between the U.S. and 
                                                          
189
  Id. at *11.  
190
  Id. 
191
  Id. at *11-12.  
192
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265, 2010 WL 2010783, at *12-13 
(C.A.D.C. 2010). 
193
  Id. at *13.  
194
  Id. 
195
  Id. at *12.   
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Afghanistan to determine the situations were actually quite 
different.  Further, whereas the district court evaluated 
obstacles from the narrow perspective of actually conducting 
habeas hearings themselves, the circuit court looked to the 
significant negative operational impact of such hearings and 
their potential for damage to the alliance between the U.S. 
and Afghanistan.   
Certain aspects of the opinion are troubling, however. 
First, the circuit court, like the district court, does not appear 
to appreciate the threshold role played in the initial part of the 
Boumediene analysis by the adequacy of the status 
determination process. Second, its emphasis on the third 
factor, the practical obstacles, in effect makes it the most 
significant of the three in conducting the Boumediene 
analysis. This would seem to be a question of typical 
common-law justiciability, rather than one of constitutional 
justiciability or jurisdiction.
196
  Third, the circuit court held 
out the possibility that another factor could be added to the 
three Boumediene factors it had applied: whether the 
Government had detained an individual at a location 
specifically to avoid any judicial review of Government 
detention decisions.
197
 The circuit court found that 
petitioners‘ arguments in this regard were not substantiated in 
the present case, and it therefore made ―no determination of 
the importance of this possibility, given that it remains only a 
possibility; its resolution can await a case in which the claim 
is a reality rather than a speculation.‖
198
  Avoiding judicial 
review was one reason Guantanamo was initially selected by 
the Bush Administration,
199
 but avoiding the application of 
U.S. domestic law to an individual already protected under 
                                                          
196
  See El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Company and Salah el 
Din Ahmed Mohammed Idris v. U.S., No. 07-5174, 2010 LEXIS 11585 
*10-12 (C.A.D.C. 2010) (discussion of justiciability related to the 
constitutional scheme of separation of powers, such as with political 
questions, versus ordinary justiciability concepts such as ripeness and 
mootness).   
197
  Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5265, 2010 WL 2010783, at *13 
(C.A.D.C. 2010). 
198
  Id.  
199
  See supra note 94. 
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international law is an operationally sound reason for 
bringing a detainee to Bagram. All provisions of the 
Constitution are not automatically applicable to all 
Government actions everywhere in the world
200
 – and courts 
should therefore very cautiously deal with issues of 
Government intent when its actions are in furtherance of its 
authority and goals in the area of foreign policy and armed 
conflict, and if measures are in place to provide meaningful 
administrative review of continued detention, as will be 
discussed next. 
VII. THE NEW PARWAN DETENTION FACILITY DETAINEE 
REVIEW PROCEDURE 
Because the circuit court decided al Maqaleh without 
examining the new procedure that has been put in place at the 
Parwan Detention Facility, the issue of how much process 
Parwan detainees should be afforded in their status 
determinations remains to be seen. This is not merely of legal 
interest – it is very significant operationally, politically and 
from a human rights perspective as the U.S. seeks to maintain 
international and particularly NATO support for the ISAF 
mission.  The new detainee review procedure is based in 
large part upon the provisions of Army Regulation 190-8 (AR 
190-8), and provides a significant increase in the process 
afforded detainees both in terms of initial determinations as 
to their status and frequent periodic reviews of those 
determinations.
201
 The first ground for detention is that an 
individual must either have been involved in the September 
2001 attacks or ―harbored those responsible for those 
attacks.‖
202
  An alternate ground is that an individual was 
either part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida 
forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities 
                                                          
200
  See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., 
concurring).  
201
  Letter from Phillip Carter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Detainee Policy, to Carl Levin, U.S. Senator (July 14, 2009), [hereinafter 
―Carter Letter‖], available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp--
content/uploads/2009/09/addendum.pdf. 
202
  Detainee Review Procedures, supra note 10, at 1.   
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against the United States or its coalition partners, including 
any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has 
directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy forces.‖
203
 
―The fact that a detainee may have intelligence value, by 
itself, is not a basis for internment,‖ and once ―a person 
detained by OEF forces is determined not to meet the criteria 
detailed above or no longer to require internment to mitigate 
their threat, the person shall be released from DOD custody 
as soon as practicable.‖
204
 In terms of process, the first status 
review occurs at the level of the capturing unit, generally 
within 72 hours, with the advice of a military lawyer.
205
 
Detainees cannot be brought into the Parwan Detention 
Facility from the capturing unit unless the Parwan Detention 
Facility commander, with the advice of a military attorney, 
conducts an entrance status review.
206
 Within 14 days of a 
detainee‘s transfer into the Parwan Detention Facility, the 
individual is advised of his rights under the detainee review 
procedure, and given an ―unclassified summary of the 
specific facts that support the basis for their internment.‖
207
  
Within 60 days of internment, and every six months 
afterwards, review boards composed of three commissioned 
officers of the rank of major or above will review ―all 
reasonably available information to determine whether each 
person transferred to the [Parwan Detention Facility] meets 
the criteria for internment and, if so, whether the person‘s 
continued internment is necessary.‖
208
 The hearings are 
conducted in conformance with AR 190-8, but include 
additional process protections for detainees, including the use 
of personal representatives to assist detainees in the 
preparation of their cases, the investigation of exculpatory 
information provided by detainees, a written procedural script 
                                                          
203
  Id. This definition is consistent with the Obama Administration‘s 
criteria for those who may be held at Guantanamo.  See Hamlily v. 
Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (2009). 
204
  Detainee Review Procedures, supra note 10, at 1.  
205
  Id. 
206
  Id. at 2. 
207
  Id. 
208
  Id. None of the board members may have been ―directly involved 
in the detainee‘s capture or transfer‖ to the Parwan Detention Facility.  Id.  
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to allow the detainee to better follow the proceedings, and 
access to all reasonably available relevant evidence.
209
 If the 
board determines that the detainee does not meet the 
requirements for continued internment, then release is to be 
made ―as soon as practicable.‖
210
 If the board finds that the 
detainee should be held, it can make one of the following 
recommendations to the general officer who convened the 
board: ―[c]ontinued internment at the [Parwan Detention 
Facility,] . . . transfer to Afghan authorities for criminal 
prosecution‖ or ―for participation in a reconciliation 
program,‖ ―[r]elease without conditions,‖ or [i]n the case of a 
non-Afghan and non-U.S. third country national,‖ either 
―transfer to a third country for criminal prosecution, 
participation in a reconciliation program, or release.‖
211
 Each 
recommendation for continued internment must be reviewed 
for legal sufficiency, and detainees are to receive notice of 




The position of the personal representative is a significant 
departure from the process afforded under AR 190-8. The 
personal representative must be a commissioned officer 
familiar with the detainee review procedures, and have access 
to all ―reasonably available information (including classified 
information) relevant to the determination of whether the 
detainee meets the criteria for internment and whether the 
detainee‘s continued internment is necessary.‖
213
 Personal 
representatives are given at least 30 days to prepare for the 
hearing. Their appointments may be waived by detainees if 
they are 18 years or older, but not if they suffer from a mental 
illness, or the general officer convening the hearing 
determines that they are ―otherwise incapable of 
understanding and participating in the review process.‖
214
 
Although they do not function as advocates before the status 
determination board, the personal representatives are required 
                                                          
209
  Id. at 3-4.  
210
  Detainee Review Procedures, supra note 10, at 4. 
211
  Id.  
212
  Id. at 5.  
213
  Id. 
214
  Id. at 64.  
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to ―assist the detainee in gathering and presenting the 
information reasonably available in the light most favorable 
to the detainee.‖
215
 Finally, serving as a personal 
representative in good faith will not adversely affect that 




The new detainee status review procedures differ from 
habeas corpus proceedings in significant ways, but not all of 
these differences mean that detainees would be afforded only 
insufficient process before the detainee review boards. In 
keeping with the latitude given the district courts under 
Boumediene to devise functional and pragmatic approaches to 
hearing detainee habeas corpus petitions,
217
 at a minimum 
detainees are to have notice and an opportunity to be heard,
218
 
to have the right to present documentary evidence and 
affidavits,
219
 the right to present exculpatory evidence,
220
 and 
to have some limited form of discovery consistent with 
safeguarding national security concerns.
221
 Hearsay may be 
admitted if its credibility can be properly assessed by the 
court,
222
 and unlike in a more traditional habeas corpus 
hearing, the burden is on the government to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence
223
 that the petitioner meets the 
standard under the Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force as an enemy combatant against whom ―all necessary 
                                                          
215
  Id. 
216
  Detainee Review Procedures, supra note 10, at 4. 
217
  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008).  
218
  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).  
219
  See id.; Mark D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus 
Procedures and Long-Term Executive Detention, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 
961, 1007-08 (2009). 
220
  Id. at 1011-012. 
221
  See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193, 195 (2008) 
(discovery motions filed, followed by closed door sessions out of 
presence of petitioners to review classified evidence). 
222
  See id. at 197 (district court‘s assessment of credibility of 
particular hearsay evidence).  
223
  See id. at 195 (citing the Case Management Order promulgated to 
assist the district courts in standardizing their approaches to these detainee 
cases). 
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and appropriate force‖ may be used.
224
   The two procedures 
are similar then in using the same standard of proof 
(preponderance of the evidence), but because the detainee 
review board hearing is not truly an adversarial proceeding, 
the government does not have the burden of persuasion.  
Detainee access to classified information is limited in both,
225
 
both consider evidence potentially inadmissible at a criminal 
trial, and both have open hearings unless closed for 
classification reasons. Neither requires defense counsel, and 
neither determines guilt of any criminal offense.
226
  In terms 
of differences, defense counsel is allowed at habeas corpus 
hearings, but not before review boards, although detainees are 
afforded personal representatives if they wish. Additionally, 
an independent judge makes the final determination as to 
whether the detainee should be held or released, as compared 
to the review board‘s ability to order release. Further, the 
general officer convening the board makes the final decision 
whether to continue detention upon review board 
recommendation, with legal advice. The net result of this 
difference is similar to that under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, in which acquittals at the trial level are not 
reviewed by the convening authority, but all convictions must 
undergo convening authority review and determination, 
because findings of guilt and adjudged punishments are 
recommendations in effect only.
227
  
The impartiality of the board is enhanced, however, by 
not allowing those officers who might have been involved in 
the case to sit on the board. A further significant difference is 
that the government is required to investigate exculpatory 
information offered by the detainee, which presumably 
includes classified information available to the personal 
representative.  A final important difference is the precise 
                                                          
224
  Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 
§§ 1-2, 115 stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) [hereinafter ―AUMF‖].  
225
  See Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 193.  
226
  Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (no 
constitutional right to counsel in habeas corpus hearing because it is a 
civil, rather than criminal, proceeding).  
227
  Rule for Courts-Martial, 1107(a), (b), Manual for Courts-Martial, 
II-149-50 (2008). 
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standard of proof the evidence must meet by a preponderance 
of the evidence. The definition used by the district court in 
the Boumediene habeas corpus hearing addresses:   
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting 
Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated 
forces that are engaged in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners. This 
includes any person who has committed a 
belligerent act or has directly supported 
hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.
228
  
As applied by the district court to the petitioners in the 
Boumediene habeas corpus hearing, the term ―support‖ meant 
―direct support,‖ such as ―facilitating the travel of others to 
join the fight against the United States in Afghanistan. . .‖
229
 
Significantly, as of March 13, 2009, the Obama 
Administration defined those at Guantanamo who may be 
detained as  
[p]ersons who planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons 
who harbored those responsible for those 
attacks [and] [p]ersons who were part of, or 
substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida 
forces or associated forces that are engaged in 
hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners, including any person who 
has committed a belligerent act, or has directly 




This definition was adopted for the detainees at the Parwan 
Detention Facility on July 2, 2009. The Obama 
Administration‘s definition appears to set a lower standard 
                                                          
228
  Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (2008).   
229
  Id. at 198.  
230
  Detainee Review Procedures, supra note 10, at 1 (emphasis 
added).  
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than that used in habeas hearings before the Boumediene 
district court and other district courts.
231
  Although the 
administration‘s standard may not suffice for domestic legal 
proceedings, it is consistent with international humanitarian 
law, for example, in terms of holding security detainees under 
Geneva Convention IV.
232
  As previously noted, some 
commentators and scholars take the position that human 
rights law should provide the applicable rules and guidance in 
these cases when a conflict is neither a strict international nor 
non-international armed conflict.
233
 This perspective, 
however, ignores the positions of the states which created our 
current understanding of what these two terms mean. If the 
states did not even want the basic provisions of Common 
Article 3 to apply to these other kinds of armed conflict, it 
does not follow that they would want the robust protections 
of human rights law applied to these conflicts.
234
 Instead, 
whether one takes the view that authority to detain on this 
basis outlined by the Obama Administration is already part of 
applicable customary international law regardless of the 
nature of the conflict,
235
 or that it should be applied by way of 
analogy under the concept of transnational armed conflict, 
this standard is functionally appropriate in a conflict such as 
                                                          
231
  See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (2009). 
232
  See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Volume I: 
Rules, Customary International Humanitarian Law, International Comm. 
of the Red Cross, at 344 (2005) (―[t]he Fourth Geneva Convention . . . 
specifies that a civilian may only be interned or placed in assigned 
residence if ‗the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely 
necessary‘ (Article 42) or, in occupied territory, for ‗imperative reasons of 
security‘ (Article 78).‖).   
233
  See note 62, supra. 
234
  It is important to note that later developments in international law 
do suggest that in certain circumstances states have agreed that human 
rights law might in fact be applicable. For example, the European Court 
of Human Rights has issued a number of judgments against Russia for 
violations of human rights arising out of the conflict in Chechnya.  See, 
e.g., Case of Batayev and Others v. Russia, Applications nos. 11354/05 




  Robert E. Barnsby, Yes, We Can: The Authority to Detain as 
Customary International Law, 202 MIL. L. REV. 53, 89 (Winter 2009). 
84 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
the one the U.S. is fighting with al Qaeda and associated 
groups – a fight which transcends the accepted definitions of 
armed conflict covered by the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  
In sum, the impartiality of the board, the use of the 
personal representative, the frequency of review, the tests for 
legal sufficiency at different stages of the process, access to 
information justifying the detention, the investigation of 
exculpatory evidence, presence at the proceedings, the 
opportunity to address the board, and the use of written 
scripts and interpreters add substantive process to the 
Detainee Review Procedures.  Although this is less process 
than that afforded in habeas corpus proceedings, the Detainee 
Review Procedures provide sufficient process to address what 
appears to be the U.S. Supreme Court‘s underlying concern 
in Boumediene – the possibility of executive detention of 
individuals indefinitely without providing a fair mechanism 
to have the reasons for their continued detention reviewed 
periodically and meaningfully. To date, little in the way of 
independent assessments of the Detainee Review Boards 
using the new procedures has been published. One reporter, 
however, based upon his observation of five board hearings 
in March 2010, noted that detainees made use of their right to 
call witnesses in their behalf, and that the personal 
representatives ―felt free to advocate on behalf of a detainee, 
challenge the factual record, and ensure that the detainee 
understood the procedures.‖
236
  The same reporter, however, 
suggested areas for improvement: avoiding the over-
classification of classified material so that detainees can 
actually review more of it rather than limiting review to just 
the personal representative, purging unreliable intelligence 
sources, and increasing staffing of the boards, to include 




                                                          
236
  Jonathon Horowitz, New Detention Rules Show Promise and 




  Id.  Although the Detainee Review Procedures provide the 
personal representative ―shall act in the best interests of the detainee‖ and 
2010 Detention Status Review Process 85 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As noted previously, either because of  the Circuit Court‘s 
decision on the Al Maqaleh case, or even if the issue is 
mooted at some point along the appeals path through transfer 
of the Parwan Detention Facility to the control of the Afghan 
government, the overarching question as to the appropriate 
detention status review mechanism to be used in the cases of 
detainees captured in an on-going transnational conflict such 
as the one between the U.S. and its allies and al Qaeda and its 
affiliates will still remain.  Were the U.S. Supreme Court to 
hear the case, proper application of the analysis from its 
decision in Boumediene should result in a holding that the 
Suspension Clause is not applicable to the Parwan Detention 
Facility regardless of the nationality of the petitioner. The 
limited nature of the leased U.S. occupancy of Bagram; the 
permission granted under the status of forces arrangement for 
the lawful presence of U.S. forces within the sovereign 
territory of Afghanistan; the presence of international forces 
under international command on the base; and the lack of 
U.S. jurisdiction over non-U.S. personnel, both military and 
civilian, serve to make Bagram much like any other overseas 
U.S. military base, but not part of the United States as 
Guantanamo is under Boumediene. The location of the 
Parwan Detention Facility in an active combat zone which is 
also the focus of transnational terrorist‘s armed and logistical 
activities further distinguishes it from the detention situation 
at Guantanamo.  Additionally, the new Detainee Review 
Procedures provide sufficient process to non-U.S. national 
detainees to prevent the possibility of erroneous and 
indefinite executive detention, although their efficacy could 
possibly be improved through different information 
classification procedures and increased Detention Review 
Board personnel quantity and language capability.  
Importantly, individuals may not be held merely for their 
                                                                                                                       
―shall assist the detainee in gathering and presenting the information 
reasonably available in the light most favorable to the detainee,‖   an issue 
which remains to be clarified is the degree of confidentially that exists 
between the personal representative and the detainee.  Detainee Review 
Procedures, supra note 10, at 6. 
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intelligence value; rather, they must be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence to have either been involved 
in the September 2001 attacks or to have directly supported al 
Qaeda or the Taliban in hostilities against U.S. or allied 
forces since then.  
Certain commentators have suggested that setting the 
standard for continued detention too high leads to an 
unpleasant paradox. For example, the standard for deciding 
whether to engage an individual with up to lethal force is 
reasonable certainty, based upon the entire intelligence 
picture known at that time that the individual is taking a 
direct part in hostilities. Reasonable certainty in a combat 
environment could be equated with probable cause. As noted 
by D.C. District Court Judge Richard Leon in his 
memorandum order documenting his decision on Mr. 
Boumediene‘s habeas petition, the standard for continued 
detention of an alleged al Qaeda fighter is preponderance of 
the evidence that the individual meets the definition of one 
who may be detained under the AUMF.
238
  This requires the 
court itself to independently assess the credibility of the 
government‘s evidence proffered to justify continued 
detention. Judge Leon further noted with regard to the 
government‘s evidence regarding Boumediene,  
[s]uffice it to say, however, that while the 
information in the classified intelligence 
report, relating to the credibility and reliability 
of the source, was undoubtedly sufficient for 
the intelligence purposes for which it was 
prepared, it is not sufficient for the purposes 
for which a habeas court must now evaluate it. 
To allow enemy combatancy to rest on so thin 
a reed would be inconsistent with the Court‘s 
obligation under the Supreme Court‘s decision 
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  Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (2008).  In a 
separate case, the Government has taken the position that although the 
authority to detain is not limited by the law of armed conflict, it is 
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Requiring a higher standard for security detention than that 
required for lethal action could lead to an incentive to kill 
rather than capture.
240
 This incentive would not necessarily 
be equally applicable to all targets – the incentive to capture 
leaders or particularly well-known fighters because of their 
intelligence or psychological value could be greater than for 
targets assessed to be mere foot soldiers.  Realistically, 
however, targeted terrorists and insurgents are perhaps more 
likely to be killed simply because missions to capture them 
would entail greater risk of collateral damage to civilians and 
civilian property, or unacceptable risk to friendly personnel 
and equipment, rather than an assessment that the legal case 
against them at some detention review procedure in the future 
is weak compared to their potential intelligence value.   
The new Parwan Detention Facility procedures are 
defended better on less speculative grounds. Although the 
standard for continued detention is not as rigorous as that 
which has been applied in habeas corpus hearings in the D.C 
District Court,
241
 it is appropriate in a transnational armed 
conflict in which non-U.S. nationals are being held outside 
the U.S. by U.S. forces in an area of active combat. 
Fortunately, the detainee review boards are not conducted in 
the heat of battle, but they are held in an austere setting 
within danger‘s reach. In light of the significant process given 
to detainees under the new Detainee Review Procedures, 
process which actually moves the standard for determining 
whether an individual should continue to be detained in the 
direction of international human rights law principles, judicial 
deference should also be accorded to the military decisions 
that flow from the effective implementation of these 
procedures.
242
 These procedures will strike a practical 
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Customary International Law, 202 MIL. L. REV. 53, 75 (Winter 2009).  
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balance between the deployed forces‘ needs for intelligence 
and security,
243
 the need to minimize the logistical burden 
placed upon deployed resources by housing, feeding and 
protecting a detention facility population,
244
 the need to 
minimize opportunities for radicalization among detainees,
245
 
and importantly, the detainees‘ and their families‘ need to 
know there is a predictable and logical process that supports 
their hope of regaining their freedom at a more definite point 
in the future.
246
  The process and transparency the procedures 
provide for detainees taken in the course of transnational 
armed conflict should be seen as a model for status 
determination in future detention operations, and importantly, 
in keeping with the concept of transnational armed conflict, 
they have the potential to flesh out a new area of substantive 
customary international humanitarian law protections for 
detainees in conflicts other than those considered 
international or non-international under the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.   
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Potentially, this process would enhance the appeal of rehabilitation 
opportunities for the less committed fighters.  
